

THE FRENCH ARMY.

The Military Powers of France—History, Strength, and Organization of the French Army.

HISTORY OF THE FRENCH ARMY.

Since the commencement of the French Revolution the French Army has displayed a most conspicuous part in the military operations of Europe; and it has now, for many years, served as a sort of model upon which other armies have been, more or less, formed. The first standing army of France was created by Charles VII. about the middle of the fifteenth century, and consisted of 16,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. The French Army, however, first assumed a regular form under Henry IV., toward the close of the sixteenth century, at which time its peace establishment did not exceed 10,000 men, including light horse and foot, the annual charge of maintaining it was \$2,500,000. In 1610 that monarch carried his army to a war-footing of 30,000 men. Thirty years later France, under the able administration of Richelieu, took an active part in the wars of Germany, and extended her forces at one time to 100,000 men, and her expenditure to \$20,000,000 in one year. Under Louis XIV., in 1689, a peace establishment of 70,000 men was maintained, which force, during the war against Germany and Spain, in 1672, was increased to the number of 100,000. The peaceful interval between 1672 and 1688 was passed by the ambitious monarch in preparations for war, the introduction of the funding system supplying him with the necessary means. The wars which terminated with the peace of Utrecht required on the part of France a force of between 200,000 and 300,000 men. There was now a more abundant and peaceful peace. The war of 1741 did not interfere with its advanced stage by Marshal Saxe, called forth a force equal to that last named, while in the war of 1756 the French army was less numerous and far less fully conducted. During the thirty years Continental peace, ending in 1792, the military establishment of France was kept with very little fluctuation, at 100,000. By the decree of May 5, in the latter year, its strength was considerably increased, it being raised to about 150,000 infantry, 20,000 cavalry, and 10,000 artillery. Twenty thousand additional men were still required to bring up the regiments to their full complement, and these were supplied by volunteers, who lacked in numbers to the national standard when the Duke of Brunswick invaded France at the head of the Prussian forces.

Carnot, who organized the camp at Chalons, was, at the end of 1793, enabled by his indomitable energy, industry, and perseverance, working sixteen hours out of the twenty-four, to oppose to the coalition armies of France no less than fourteen different armies. He was the head and the hand that directed the War Office, and traced the plans of the different campaigns. During his ministry the first campaigns of Napoleon and Moreau were organized. He at the same time conferred with the Generals, and without the aid of a secretary, corresponded with the four armies. The Republican spirit was now at its height, and the unlimited issue of assignats led to the maintenance of a force hitherto unexampled in the history of any country, ancient or modern. In 1794, the French in actual service in Netherlands, on the Rhine, in Piedmont, the Pyrenees, and La Vendée, amounted to from 500,000 to 600,000 men. In the following year, France presented the formidable aspect of a vast camp, and the official state of the force of the French armies on the 21st of April, 1794, presents an aggregate of 751,353 men, including garrisons, but exclusive of the Army of the Interior, whose headquarters were at Paris. Allowing for sick, and for those in the depots, the world, doubtless, give an efficient force present under arms of 689,000, certainly the most formidable army which Europe had ever seen assembled in the field.

In March, 1795, France had ten armies in the field, the active force of which amounted to 449,250 combatants, beside 129,550 in garrisons, and 388,450 sick, prisoners, or detained; in all 957,250 soldiers. But the active force, or number present under arms, did not form more than a third of the complete military strength of France at that period; for as 200,000 men were still wanting to bring the effective force up to the full establishment, and as the most active measures were in progress to make up the deficit, the total number of Frenchmen under arms in 1795 cannot have fallen much short of 1,100,000 men. But an army of this extent was more than the population of France, or its exhausted resources could maintain. Accordingly in the succeeding years of the Republic the aggregate of the different armies seldom exceeded 480,000 effective men, and generally fell short of that number. However, when Napoleon had mounted the throne and had organized the system of conscription, he obtained an unlimited command over the whole of that part of the population capable of bearing arms. The French army in 1805 amounted to an aggregate of 570,567 men, comprised as follows: 341,412 infantry, 46,429 artillery, and 83,726 cavalry. But this force was afterwards greatly increased, and it is calculated that, at the time of the Russian campaign, there were in the depots, in the hospitals, and in the field, not less than 1,200,000 men, of whom about 850,000 might be considered as effective. These numbers will account for the extraordinary phenomenon of Napoleon appearing in Germany at the head of a new and formidable army, within a few months after the termination of his veteran marches in the frozen regions of Russia.

In 1812 Bonaparte, on his return from Elba, found under arms in France, about 150,000 men, all of whom, with the exception of a few thousands, rejoined his standard. But, so weak were the French people of war, that the greatest efforts, during the next three months, added only 60,000 to the number, and the loss of one battle exposed all the hopes of resistance to the enemy.

On the second retreat of the Bonapartes, after the battle of Waterloo, the army fell into a very disorganized state, the disciplined soldiers having been dispersed, and the ranks filled by new levies. This led, in 1818, to an enactment by which the conscription was revived, and in a mitigated form, which allowed a great latitude in providing substitutes. The number of conscripts now annually required was 90,000, and the term of service was six years. The annual levies that had been made by Napoleon were apparently 80,000, but they actually amounted to not less than 100,000.

When Louis Philippe was chosen King of the French the army was reorganized, and the policy of the new monarch led him to seek employment for his troops. The conquest of Algeria soon found occasion for the increase of the army, and for the employment of the young princes in commands. In 1832 the aggregate force was 411,816, which included 19,000 officers and 3,794 children. The Infantry, which at this time included the Guards, amounted to 254,141 men, including 9,000 officers. The Cavalry, comprising the various divisions of Chasseurs, Dragons, Carabiniers and Hussars, amounted to 51,236 men, including 2,905 officers; and the Artillery to 32,494 men, including 1,190 officers. Besides these there were Gendarmes, Engineers, &c., the last named being a numerous and well-educated body of officers.

The wars in which the French army has been engaged under the present regime are, the Crimean, the English, Turkish, and Sardinian allies,

against Russia; the Italian, in which it was allied with the Sardinian army, against Austria; the Chinese expedition, undertaken in conjunction with the English; and a small affair on its own account in Cochin China. During the first named war France contributed no less than 302,268 men, and her loss in deaths alone was 67,056, of which latter number 4,561 fell by the hand of disease, during the three months previous to the evacuation, a period of suffering from typhus and cholera. The loss in missing and prisoners during the siege of Sevastopol was 2,573, of which only 792 were afterward restored by exchange, leaving 1,781 missing and not accounted for. In addition to these, 392 were lost by the wreck of the *Tenille*. The total loss is thus 69,225. The official reports give no account of the number that were wounded in the campaign. Of 41,971 horses sent to the Crimea, only 9,000 were returned to France, as most of the animals were taken to Turkey and transferred to the Ottoman Government. Major Mordecai, one of the Military Commissioners sent by the United States Government to Europe, reported the strength of the French army, in 1855, as being, exclusive of gendarmes, veterans, &c., about 550,000 men, divided as follows: infantry, 382,000; cavalry, 80,000; artillery, 57,000; engineers, 8,000; administrative, &c., 17,000. The whole number of officers of all kinds he estimated at 29,000. By the *Budget Provisions* of 1855, the expenses of the Minister of War were fixed at \$63,173,555.

In the battle of Solferino, which terminated the Italian War in 1859, there were more than 300,000 troops engaged on both sides. In this engagement the French had, according to their own statement, 12,730 killed and wounded, and the Sardinians 5,565. The Austrians put down their loss at 11,213, but it is generally asserted to have exceeded 18,000.

PRESENT STRENGTH OF THE FRENCH ARMY.

The Budget of the Minister of War for 1861-62 fixes the present strength of the French army as follows:

—WAR FOOTING.—		—PEACE FOOTING.—	
Active Troops.	Men.	Active Troops.	Men.
Infantry	330,000	Infantry	250,000
Cavalry	80,000	Cavalry	60,000
Artillery	60,000	Artillery	40,000
Engineers	15,000	Engineers	10,000
Administrative	20,000	Administrative	15,000
Military Justice	4,000	Military Justice	3,000
Total	509,000	Total	378,000

These figures make a grand total of 757,770 men and 142,300 horses for the war footing, and 414,974 men and 73,850 horses for the peace footing. In the discussion on the Budget last year in the Corps Legislatif, the actual effective army was stated to be then 650,000 men. The number of guns is 1,362.

The arm voted for the support of the army during the year is \$75,000,000.

The military arsenals and warehouses place at its disposal the disposal of the army immense stores of munitions of war of every kind.

The organization of the French army, which is divided into active troops and troops for home service, is as follows:

TROOPS FOR ACTIVE SERVICE.

1. THE IMPERIAL GUARD.—This forms a complete corps d'armée in itself, and is composed as follows: 1 regiment of foot gendarmes; 7 of grenadiers and voltigeurs; and 1 of zouaves; 100 horse guards (the "Cent-Gardes"); 1 squadron of gendarmes à cheval; and 6 regiments of cavalry; 15 batteries of artillery; 1 company of pensioners; 2 of engineers, and 4 of train.

2. THE INFANTRY consists of 103 regiments of the line, each having three active battalions and one depot battalion, 20 battalions of chasseurs, 3 regiments of zouaves, 2 regiments of foreign infantry, 3 battalions of African light infantry, 3 regiments of *Touros* or *Trochades*, *Algeriens*, and 2 disciplinary companies. The regiments of zouaves, *Touros*, and foreign infantry have also 3 battalions.

3. THE CAVALRY is composed of 2 regiments of cuirassiers and 19 regiments of carabiniers, forming the reserve; 12 regiments of dragons and 8 of hussars forming the cavalry of the line; and 12 regiments of chasseurs à cheval, 8 of hussars, and 3 of chasseurs d'Afrique, forming the light cavalry; also, 3 regiments of Spahis. Each cavalry regiment is divided into 6 squadrons.

4. THE ARTILLERY includes 4 regiments of horse artillery, with 32 batteries; 10 regiments of mounted artillery, with 100 batteries; 3 regiments of foot artillery, with 80 batteries; regiment of pontonniers, and 2 squadrons of train.

5. THE ENGINEERS comprise 3 regiments of sappers and miners, with 2 companies of workmen.

The organization of the artillery is based upon the effective strength of the army in cavalry and infantry. The amount of the corps of engineers is, as well defined principles of military administration, determined by the numbers of divisions of the infantry to which they can be attached, the strong places to defend, and the reserve required for sieges.

TROOPS FOR HOME SERVICE.

1. THE GENDARMERIE, although it is entirely made up from the active army, is only charged with the police duty, and it is scattered in small divisions throughout the Empire. There are 27 legions in the departments and 1 legion in Algeria, forming together 100 companies. There are also 16 companies and 4 squadrons Garde de Paris; also, 10 companies of super-pensioners, or firemen.

2. THE VÉTÉRANES comprise 18 companies, mostly composed of invalids.

3. THE NATIONAL GUARD is the militia of France. Its strength is undecided, as it rests with the Government; but all Frenchmen of good body, between the ages of 25 and 50, are compelled to serve in it. These are generally employed only to maintain internal order, and are only in case of need called upon to join the active army. Their number has been considerably lessened since the *coup d'état*, and there is at present no idea of employing them in the field. The present Government, which justly fears them, and only formally respects them as a historical tradition, retains the privilege of nominating the higher officers. Nevertheless the National Guard forms an important agent in the armaments of France. Their number is about 100,000, but 300 battalions of 1,000 men each might be easily raised. The National Guard are generally under the civil authorities, and only during war are under the military. The State provides their armaments, and the rest is left to the companies. Without the special permission of the Minister of the Interior, they only form Infantry corps, subdivided into companies, battalions, and legions—each battalion consisting of from four to eight companies. There are, however, cavalry corps in Paris.

THE COMPOSITION OF A REGIMENT.

The staff of an infantry regiment of three battalions, or a cavalry regiment of three squadrons, consists of 1 colonel, 1 lieutenant-colonel, 3 chiefs of battalions or squadrons, 1 major, 3 adjutants, with rank of captain (*capitaine adjoint major*), 1 treasurer, with rank of captain (*capitaine trésorier*), 1 captain of clothing (*capitaine d'habillement*), 1 sous-trésorier, a sub-lieutenant, 1 standard-bearer, a sub-lieutenant, and 3 surgeons. To the staff of a regiment of four battalions or squadrons, 1 chief of battalion or squadron and 1 adjutant are added; and for a regiment of 2 battalions or squadrons there are but 2 chiefs of battalions or squadrons and 2 adjutants. An independent battalion or squadron has a further reduction in the numbers of the staff. With the staff there are also likewise connected non-com-

missioned adjutants, drummers, buglers, musicians, and pioneers; and with the cavalry, veterinary surgeons, saddlers, and farriers, in addition.

With the exception of the foot rifle, a company consists of 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 sub-lieutenant, 1 orderly sergeant, 4 sergeants, 1 quartermaster-sergeant, 8 corporals, 96 privates (the number of privates varying somewhat according to circumstances), 2 musicians, 2 pupils in music, and 1 enfant de troupe. In the foot rifle there is an additional sergeant, as instructor in firing, 4 buglers, no pupils in music, and from 100 to 130 privates.

On the war establishment each squadron of cavalry of the line has 38 privates of the second class, and each squadron of light cavalry has 108.

THE GENERAL OFFICERS.

The higher gradations of rank are Marshal of France, the entire number of which is limited to 12; at present there are 11; generals of division (lieutenant-generals); and generals of brigade (major-generals). The number of generals of both ranks is very large, there being 90 of the former and 160 of the latter in active service. There is also a still larger number on the reserved and pensioned lists. Generals of brigade, after passing their 63rd year, and generals of division, at the age of 65, are attached to the reserve, with three-fifths of their former pay, but are liable to be called upon to serve in the interior in case of war. They are only retired with pensions at their own request.

ADMINISTRATION OF THE ARMY.

The affairs of the French army are administered by the Minister of War under the orders and decrees of the Emperor. There are five principal branches, each having its particular duties, at the head of each of which branches is a General; there are also six consulting committees, each having its specialty, composed of generals and staff officers. The general staff is divided into the staff of the army, comprising the marshals, and all the generals, active, reserve, and pensioned; and the corps of the general staff, or *état-major*, which contains 580 officers from colonels to lieutenants. From this corps all the adjutants of the army, as also the whole of the general staff of the military divisions and sub-divisions, are derived. Other members are employed in the various branches of the War department, and one captain of the second class is selected from this corps, for service with each infantry and cavalry regiment.

Connected with the administration of war, there are an immense number of employees, clerks, messengers, porters, &c., all working under the immediate direction of one individual. The expense is enormous, but there is certainty, efficiency, and unity of action. The Minister of War has the sole and undivided authority and responsibility in command of the army; and all functions connected with the service are not merely subordinate but obedient to him. In a word, the army receives its impulse, its administrative direction, and its guarantee of preservation, from a staff admirably organized and composed—a corps of control drawn from the ranks of the army itself, and distinguished by its intelligence, its integrity, and its firmness; from a staff corps, as solidly constituted by its excellent organization and courageous devotion; and from various other administrative departments equally recruited from the army. The whole of these departments, from their actual origin, their military spirit, and their good service, have acquired the confidence of the whole army.

For the command and administration of the troops the territory of France is divided into six great military departments or *corps d'armée*, the troops in which are under the command of a marshal. These are subdivided into twenty-two divisions, commanded by a general of division, and further subdivided into eighty-six districts corresponding with the geographical departments of France, each district being under the control of a general of brigade. Algeria, similarly subdivided, forms a seventh *corps d'armée*. The commandant of each department, division, and district is surrounded by a staff and a suitable number of administrative officers and employees.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT.

The Medical Department of the French army consists of 1,366 surgeons and apothecaries. This body is recruited by pupils of the military medical school established in Paris a few years ago. The surgeons are attached to armies or districts as inspectors, or to hospitals, regiments, and corps as medical officers. They have different grades as inspectors, principal physicians or surgeons, and assistants, but have no unqualified rank with other officers of the army, nor do they exercise any command either in hospitals or in the field.

MILITARY EDUCATION IN FRANCE.

The system of military education in France is of a superior character, and the military profession is viewed as it was at Athens, at Sparta, and at Rome. The French cultivate in their military schools gymnastics and bodily exercises, as well as the theory of strategy and war. Young men are instructed in these sciences by rule and precept, illustrated by practice. The most ample means are provided for the education of officers and non-commissioned officers, in all branches of the military service. There are ten great military schools, each with its specialty. The preparatory schools for officers are the Polytechnic School at Paris, the Special School at St. Cyr, and the Military School at La Flèche; the special schools are the Firing School at Vincennes, the Polytechnic School at Metz, the Military Medical School at Paris, and the Veterinary School at Alfort; and the exercising schools are the School of the General Staff at Paris, the Engineer and Artillery School at Metz, and the Cavalry School at Saumur. The latter school, situated on the banks of the Loire, is the most perfect and extensive institution of the kind in Europe, perhaps the only one really deserving the title, the others being more properly schools of equipment. Its purpose is to diffuse throughout the corps an uniform system of instruction in everything relating to the principles of equitation, and other branches of knowledge appropriate to the cavalry arm. There is a considerable school for the instruction of from 3,000 to 4,000 *sous-officiers*, who are drafted hence into different regiments to instruct their corps.

In addition to the schools already named there are also one for military music; regimental schools for junior officers of the cavalry and the line; firing schools for officers and non-commissioned officers; for infantry regiments and chasseurs battalions; for twelve artillery and three engineer schools for non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

RECRUITMENT.

The French army is recruited by conscription and by voluntary enlistment, the former being understood to be subsidiary or supplementary to the latter. The conscription includes all Frenchmen of the age of 20 years, but certain services or occupations procure exemption from service. The men required from each district are drawn out by lot. Those not drawn form a reserve, liable to be called on at any time. A council of revision decides on the qualifications, exemptions, &c. Substitutes fit for service are allowed. The minimum stature of the recruit is 5 ft. 11 in. The term of service is seven years, but the actual service with the colors is frequently limited to four or five years. Soldiers discharged before the expiration of their term, together with the

conscripts not called into service, form the reserve, which generally amounts to about 180,000 men. The annual levies are about 80,000 men. The corps of gendarmes, we have already stated, is recruited from the soldiers of the army, of which it may be considered as forming a part. The regulation height of cavalry soldiers varies from a fraction below 5 ft. 7 in. to a fraction over 5 ft. 10 in., there being different standards for different regiments.

The charge to Government of a foot soldier in France does not, in time of peace, exceed \$100 a year; that of the cavalry soldier is nearly double that amount.

APPOINTMENT AND PROMOTION OF OFFICERS.

A candidate for the appointment of second or sub-lieutenant must be at least eighteen years of age, and must either have served two years as a non-commissioned officer or be a graduate of a military school. For promotion to a lieutenantancy or captaincy, the officer must have served two years in the next lowest grade. For major, or the corresponding rank of chief of battalion or squadron, he must have served four years as a captain. For a lieutenant-colonel, three years; for a colonel, two years; and for a general of brigade or division, three years in the next lowest grade. A marshal must have served three years as a general of division, and have had the chief command of an army, or army corps, before the enemy. It will thus be seen that the youth who enters the army at 18 cannot, in time of peace, by the most rapid rate of promotion, anticipate becoming a general of division before he is 55 years of age. To become a marshal, he must not only wait three years longer, but have been actually present in an engagement.

For brilliant actions, noticed in general orders, promotions are made without regard to the above rules; and generally, in time of war, the term of service required for promotion may be reduced one-half.

Ordinary promotions are partly made by selection of the Emperor, and partly by seniority. For the lowest grade of Lieutenant, one-third of the appointments are made from non-commissioned officers; the other two-thirds from the military schools. In time of peace two-thirds of the First Lieutenants and Captains, and one-half of the Majors and officers of corresponding rank, are promoted according to seniority. In time of war, the Majors, &c., are promoted by selection. All officers of superior rank to Major are at all times promoted by selection. The selections for promotion are regulated by lists of merit prepared annually at the general inspection. No brevet or honorary rank can be bestowed. For the promotion of officers of the medical staff and the administration, there are special rules similar to those for officers of regiments and corps.

RETIREMENT AND PENSIONS.

The retiring pensions are regulated according to rank and length of service. The right to a pension is acquired by thirty years of actual service. Certain allowances are made for special services and for campaigns. For service beyond thirty years the pension is increased, and also for service for more than twelve years in the grade on which the pension is allowed. Wounds or diseases contracted in service give a right to pension at various rates, according to the degree of disability, or to admission into the magnificent asylum for invalids in Paris.

Of the retirement of general officers we have already spoken.

Pensions are also allowed to the widows and children of soldiers killed in battle, or who die from wounds or contagious diseases contracted in actual service; also, of those who die while in the enjoyment of a pension. The widow's pension is generally one-fourth of that the husband either has or would have received, according to his grade. After the death of the mother, the pension descends to her children, until the youngest reaches the age of 21.

THE FRENCH SOLDIER.

We have already said enough to show that the military education of a French soldier is eminently practical. He is insured to fatigue, and hardened by exercise. Drilled to walk at quick paces, carrying heavy burdens, to climb steep ascivities, and to creep along the sides of precipices, he is early taught that success in warfare is more constant attendant on boldness, intelligence, address, and audacity, than on mere numbers and brute force. The military art, it is truly said, becomes, among the French, a national and patriotic sentiment, and every feeling, thought, and aspiration of the soldier is bound up in the service of his country. No nation is so void of military success, and this is a reason why its people so readily become good soldiers. The Frenchman, too, is by nature and disposition a campaigner. He is eager and adventurous, gay, bold, and somewhat reckless, and even disposed to make the best of everything in this world. No man more easily accommodates himself to circumstances, or makes himself more at home in a strange land. He is an excellent marcher, an expert forager, and above all a skilful cook. He can bake, and roast, and stew, and make soups, and dress eggs, and produce omelets in scores of ways. He can darn his own stockings, patch his own coat, and wash his shirt in a running brook, or cobble his shoes under the shade of a tree. He can hunt himself with the ingenuity of a beaver, pitch his tent in a solitudes spot, and sing and dance with real light-heartedness.

Napoleon's saying that "every French soldier carries his marshal's staff in his knapsack" has never been forgotten. Every soldier knows the history of men who have entered the army in houses and died in Marshal's uniforms. Every man in the army has a latent idea that he will some day or other become a general. Of his fitness for that exalted position he has not a shadow of a doubt. War with him is a lottery, in which the death of a comrade increases his chance of drawing a prize.

A word, in conclusion, about the Zouaves. These are all Frenchmen, and are selected from the other campaigners for their fine physique and tried courage, and they have certainly proved that they are what their appearance would indicate—the most reckless, self-reliant, and complete infantry that Europe can produce. Gen. Mettlen, in his Report on the French Army, thus speaks of these soldiers: "With his graceful dress, soldierly bearing, and vigilant attitude, the Zouave, at an outpost, is the ideal of a soldier. They neglect no opportunity of adding to their personal comfort; if there is a stream in the vicinity, the party marching on picket is sure to be amply supplied with fish-roses, &c. If anything is to be had the Zouaves are quite certain to obtain it." "Their movements," continues he, "are the most light and graceful I have ever seen; the stride is long, but the foot seems scarcely to touch the ground, and the march is apparently made without effort or fatigue."

Gen. Mettlen further states that the Zouaves possess that solid ensemble and reckless dash—devoted individuality which would render them alike formidable when attacking in mass, or in defending a position in the more desperate hand-to-hand encounter; and he says that of all the troops he has ever seen he should esteem it the greatest honor to assist in detaching the Zouaves.

A HARD HEAD.—The *Pitchfork Revue* says that Charles Burrell, a butcher, jumped in front of the locomotive, at Ashburnham Junction, and his head struck one of the brass cylinder heads of the engine with such force as to make a dent two inches square in the cylinder. Burrell's head is cut, but otherwise he is not much injured, and will survive.

A LETTER FROM L. MARIA CHILD.

Emancipation and Amalgamation.

To the Editor of The N. Y. Tribune.

SIR: A gentleman in Maryland, to whom I sent my Tract on West India Emancipation, entitled "The Right Way the Safe Way," replied:

"On the wisdom of Emancipation, and as proving that the right way is the safe way, I think your pamphlet is unanswerable. But there are other things than wisdom are to be met. One of the most foolish and yet most potent assertions is that negroes and whites will amalgamate if the slaves are freed. My own belief, founded on very sufficient reasons, is that Slavery, and not Freedom, is the fruitful source of amalgamation. I have no figures or evidence of any kind to prove this, other than what I surround me. If you have any statistics on this subject, which you think would be useful to the cause of Emancipation, you would much oblige me by forwarding them."

In reply, I wrote as follows:

"I am not aware that any statistics are on record concerning the subject of your inquiry. The entry about future amalgamation is merely one of the artful dodges by which slaveholders and their allies seek to evade the main question. Of course, anybody who knows anything about Slavery is well aware that amalgamation is the universal and inevitable result of that system. Gen. Lafayette, during his last visit to this country, remarked upon the great change of complexion that had taken place among the slaves since the period of our Revolution. I could furnish you with innumerable advertisements from Southern papers describing runaway slaves with 'sandy hair,' 'blue eyes,' 'reddish complexion,' 'early passing for a white man,' &c., to say nothing of 'yellow boys' and 'light mulattoes.' But this is unnecessary; for your letter admits that Slavery is the fruitful source of amalgamation."

Whether amalgamation would take place legally, as it now does illegally, if the slaves were freed, is not a question susceptible of proof. It must, of course, remain a matter of opinion till experience furnishes evidence. But it seems to me quite superfluous to trouble ourselves about it. If there is an instinctive antipathy between the races, it will take care of itself, as natural antipathies and attractions are always sure to do. If there is not any natural antipathy, then the horror of amalgamation has no rational foundation. My own opinion is that there is not a natural antipathy between white and colored people. My reason for thinking so is that wherever the two classes have been brought into vicinity they have invariably mixed extensively; and, in view of their relative positions, it must be admitted that the mixture has been sought by the whites.

My own belief also is that prejudice against complexion is entirely founded upon pride, and grows out of the debased and degraded condition in which our laws and customs keep the colored people. This is sufficiently proved by the fact that slaveholders have the utmost horror of legalized amalgamation, while they have none at all of illegal. They would consider their families disgraced forever if a son should marry the most beautiful and intelligent of quadroons, but are quite undisturbed by his brood of illegitimate mulatto children, owning some "Coal-black Rose" for their mother.

From all the information I can obtain, I should judge that there is much less mixture of white and colored in the British West Indies, than there was before emancipation. The bad habits formed in Slavery still cling to them in a considerable degree; for generations must be educated under better influences before the corrupt effects of a system so thoroughly unclean can be washed out of the character of a people. But the colored inhabitants of these islands are gradually acquiring habits of self-respect, and they more and more discountenance neglect of the marriage ceremony. Marriages have occurred between white and colored, and in some cases they have been persons of high position. Some judges and lawyers of distinction in the West Indies have married handsome, intelligent, and well-educated mulatto ladies, and nothing has occurred to make them ashamed of their choice; for their wives preside over their households in a manner so graceful and dignified as to command respect even from American guests. But such cases are exceptional. Prejudices wear out slowly, and finally disappear, without violent collisions with the changing state of things. Carlyle said, very wisely: "He is not dismayed. The old skin never falls off till a new skin has formed under it. We may safely trust to this law of nature. Legalized amalgamation can never become common so long as there is a prevailing prejudice against color; and when that 'phantom dynamo' passes away with the centuries, its disappearance will harm no one, and posterity will wonder at the terror our ancestors had of witchcraft. It is the duty of our day to obey the plain dictates of justice and humanity, which are also the dictates of enlightened policy. God will not fail in His promise that 'the effects of righteousness shall be peace.'"

This entry about amalgamation, as the result of emancipation, is simply ridiculous in view of the avowal of mulattoes, quadroons, and creoles, produced by Slavery; but in view of the momentous issues now at stake in this country, it is worse than ridiculous; it is heartless, wicked trifling with the destinies of a great nation.

Candid, reflecting, disinterested men, all over the civilized world, agree that Slavery is a bad system, injurious to all parties connected with it. Statistics abundantly prove that Agriculture, Commerce, Manufactures, Morals, Education, and Internal Improvement of all sorts, are rapidly advanced by free institutions. There is ample evidence of this in the comparative progress of different States in this country. Virginia furnishes one of these instructive illustrations. She surpasses other States in richness of soil, attractions of scenery and climate, wealth of mineral resources, noble rivers, and commodious harbors. At the close of the Revolution, her commerce was four times that of New-York; but in 1833 the imports into New-York were valued at \$150,000,000, while those of Virginia were less than \$50,000,000. In Virginia, capable of producing from 25 to 30 bushels of wheat to the acre, and only 24 hours by rail from New-York, she is to be had for one-fourth the price of similar land in New-York itself. Such was the comparative value of land in those two States in 1836.

The prosperity of any State depends very largely on an intelligent, thriving middle class. Where Slavery exists, society inevitably arranges itself into two classes, very widely separated from each other, and mutually deteriorated in character by the pernicious system which gives them no interests in common. The masters are unenterprising and indolent, from pride and inertia produced by the habit of living on another's earnings; while the slaves are lazy and shiftless, because they have no hope of bettering their condition by exertion. Slavery endangers our republican institutions by rendering impossible that enlightened middle class, which forms the solid foundation of republics. Freedom of Speech, Freedom of the Press, and free extension of knowledge, are the bulwarks of liberty; but Slavery annihilates them, because their exercise is incompatible with their own safety. The phrase "irrepressible conflict" merely expresses the moral antagonism, which must, in the very nature of things, exist between Slavery and Freedom. Slavery cannot preserve its own existence without undermining and eventually destroying that on which the very life of free institutions depends. On the other hand, free institutions cannot carry out the principles on which they are founded, without bringing the permanence of Slavery into peril, even where there is no such intention. The principles of Slavery, or the principles of Freedom, must inevitably rule in this country. Is there anything so lovely, so beneficial, or so profitable in Slavery, that men should be willing to sacrifice the Republic for the sake of preserving it?

NO MORE COAL.—In consequence of the numerous frauds and deceptions practiced by some of the poor of the city, notwithstanding the vigilance exercised by the "Visitors," we understand that the Commissioners of Charities and Corrections have determined to abolish the distribution of coal during the coming Winter. Hereafter the Commissioners have, upon the recommendation of their Visitors, distributed, every Winter, thousands of tons of coal to the poor of New-York, in addition to paying out large sums of money to the needy. Many instances have come to light in which the charity of the Commissioners has been abused; hence their determination to abolish the coal distribution.

It was formerly asserted that Emancipation would produce massacres, fires, and all sorts of horrors. But England, France, the Dutch, the Swedes, and the Danes, successively emancipated their slaves, and not a throat was cut, or a building fired, in consequence. That pretext being taken away, slaveholders now say: "The two races cannot live together in freedom. If we emancipate, universal amalgamation will be the consequence." What a laughable contradiction there is between the two propositions! If there is such imminent danger of mixture, what becomes of the alleged natural antipathy of the races?

I presume you are aware that Slavery has forced even the United States Census into its service; making use of compulsory labor, as usual. In order to prove that freedom produces insanity in colored people, it returns an extraordinary number of colored lunatics in the Free States; but, as often happens to dealers in falsehood, a hole is left in the bag, through which the cat's head and claws peep out; for some places represented as "incumbered with colored lunatics" had not a single colored resident. Mr. De Bow, the unscrupulous champion of Slavery, gives no particular statistics of amalgamation; but in his Compendium of the United States Census for 1850, he makes a remark apparently intended to show that where the colored people are free, amalgamation increases. He says: "While nearly half of the colored population in the non-slaveholding States are mulatto, only about one-ninth in